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JOINT TENANCY AND ESTATE TAX AVOIDANCE: A
WIDENING LOOPHOLE FOR TRANSFERS IN
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH*
SEcTIoNs 2035 through 2044 of the Internal Revenue Code I prevent the
use of inter vivos substitutes for testamentary transfers as a means of avoiding
the federal estate tax.2 These provisions disregard-for estate tax purposes-
certain transfers which nominally divest property owners of title 3 without
loss of substantial control.4 Familiar examples of such transfers include
grants reserving a life estate to the transferor, transfers in joint tenancy, and
*Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949), reversing 10 T.C. 961
(1948) ; A. Carl Borner, 25 T.C. No. 70 (Dec. 20, 1955).
1. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2035-44; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811, 53 STAT. 121.
The portions of both statutes relevant to this Note are alike; hereinafter current designa-
tions are used.
2. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 112 (1940) ; United States v. Wells, 283
U.S. 102, 116-117 (1931); 1 PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 7.05 (1942)
(hereinafter cited as PAUL).
The concept "substitutes for testamentary transfers", while embracing both transfers
in contemplation of death and transfers "too much akin to testamentary dispositions" to
escape the estate tax, Helvering v. Hallock, supra, is restricted to those transactions des-
cribed in §§ 2036-42 of the Code. See note 4 infra.
Though prevention of tax avoidance is the primary function of these sections, one au-
thority suggests that all inter vivos transfers may one day be subject to the estate tax on
the broader ground that they are by definition "substitute testamentary transfers." 1 PAUL
§ 7.05. On this view, imposition of the tax does not require the presence of some power or
interest in the donor at death. Policy-wise, this would mean a death tax on all property once
a generation.
3. Thus, imposition of the tax largely turns on such concepts as "economic contribution"
and "control." See text and citations at notes 31 and 32 infra. Distinct tax concepts are
similarly employed under the income tax. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61, (formerly
§ 22(a) of the 1939 Code) ; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335-37 (1940) and Burnet
v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 677 (1933) (interpreting § 61 as cutting across technical concepts of
ownership and holding "substantial control" equivalent to legal ownership for income tax
purposes). See also INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 677 (trust income taxed to grantor) ; id.,
§ 704(e) (family partnership).
Though tax concepts may be "distinct" from property law, the two are never wholly
independent. "For it is state law which creates the economic substance of one's rights, how-
ever it may respect traditional [distinctions] ... for nonfiscal purposes." 1 PAUL § 1.10, at
64.
4. Formally, the "substantial control" doctrine does not operate in the estate tax. See
Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942) ; PAUL § 4.12 (Supp. 1946) ;
Note, 64 YALE L.J. 137, 143-45 (1954). Instead, imposition of the tax is contingent on a dece-
dent's retaining at death one of the interests specified by §§ 2036-42, regardless of his
dominion over property by other means. But the concept of "control" is nonetheless basic to
the estate tax, since §§ 2036-42 uniformly describe transactions whereby decedents have
maintained substantial control over property.
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transfers in trust with reserved powers to alter and amendY To prevent cir-
cumvention of estate tax rates,6 effort is made to determine a decedent's gross
estate by his actual life-time control over property rather than by legal title.
Thus, sections 2036 through 2042 specify those indicia of ownership or control
which, if retained over previously transferred property until death, may cause
the transferor's gross estate to include the entire value of the property and not
merely retained interests. 7 Moreover, section 2035 was intended to strengthen
5. Others include transfers with a general power of appointment reserved, annuity con-
tracts under which the donor receives a life income, and life insurance policies with power
in the donor to change beneficiaries.
6. Since a gift tax is presumably paid on inter vivos transfers, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 2501-16, only the higher estate tax rates are protected by §§ 2035-44. At present, the
gift tax rate is three quarters of the estate tax rate. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION 895 (1955). Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2001 (gift tax) with id.,
§ 2502 (estate tax). Further impetus for avoiding the estate tax derives from the generous
exemptions and separate scale of progression under the gift tax. BIrTKER, op. cit. supra
at 901 (1955).
7. The relevant portions of these sections are:
"§ 2036. TRANSFMRS WITH RETAINED Lr= ESTATE.
(a) GENERAL RuLE.-The ... gross estate shall include ... all property... to
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has ... made a transfer...
by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life ...
(1) The possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the prop-
erty, or
(2) the right.., to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property
or the income therefrom....
"§ 2037. TRANSFERS TAKING EFFECT AT DEATH.
(a) GENERAL RULE.-The ...gross estate shall include ... all property ...
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has ... made a transfer
if-
(1) possession or enjoyment of the property can, through ownership of such
interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and
(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest in the property ....
"§ 2038. REVOCABLE TRANSFERS.
(a) IN GENERAI..-The ... gross estate shall include.., all property ... [to]
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has ... made a transfer...
where the enjoyment thereof was subject at . . .his death to any change through
the exercise of a power. . . by the decedent... to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate,
or where any such power is relinquished in contemplation of decendent's death ...
"§ 2039. ANNUITIES.
(a) GENERAL-The gross estate shall include .. . an annuity or other pay-
ment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the decedent under any
form of contract or agreement ... if, under such contract or agreement, an annuity
or other payment was payable to the decedent, or the decedent possessed the right
to receive such annuity or payment ....
"§ 2040. JOINT INTERESTS.
The... gross estate shall include ... all property ... to the extent of the interest
therein held as joint tenants ...or as tenants by the entirety by the decedent and
spouse ... except such part thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged
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this approach 8 by imposing like tax consequences on transfers when made "in
contemplation of death."9 In recent years, however, some courts have failed
to recognize that these sections are in effect sister provisions, made interde-
pendent to accomplish a common tax purpose. 10 This failure may enable
transferors to relinquish "strings" of control in contemplation of death without
incurring the severe tax consequences of control retained at death, thus under-
mining sections 2036 to 2042. #
to such other person and never to have been received or acquired by the latter from
the decedent for less than an adequate and full consideration....
"8 2041. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
(a) IN GENERAL.-The value of the gross estate shall include ... all property
•.. (1) Powers of appointment created on or before October 21, 1942-To the extent
of any property with respect to which a general power of appointment.., is exercised
by the decendent . . . [and] (2) Powers created after October 21, 1942-To the
extent of any property with respect to which the decedent has at the time of his
death a general power of appointment....
"§ 2042. PROCEEDS OF LIFE INSURANCE
The value of the gross estate shall include ... all property ...
(1) ... to the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance
under policies on the life of the decedent.
(2) ... to the extent of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insur-
ance under policies on the life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent
possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership ....
8. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 116-17 (1931) ; Humphrey's Estate
v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 817 (1947). Some such pro-
vision is considered essential for a successful estate tax. BirKm, op. cit. supra note 6, at
900 (1955) ; 1 PAUL § 6.03. But the complex operation of the statutes, based as they have
been on subjective criteria, undercut their effectiveness. 1 id. § 6.02.
9. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811,(c), 53 STAT. 121. The
1954 Code added the "three-year" rule, specifying that transfers within three years of death
are presumed in contemplation of death. The relevant parts of this section are:
"8 2035. TRANSACTIONS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH.
(a) GENERAL RuLE .The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property ... to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer ... by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of his death.
(b) APPLICATION OF GENERAL RULE. -If the decedent within a period of 3 years
ending with the date of his death ... transferred an interest in property . . . such
transfer . . . shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed . . . in contemplation
of death . . . ; but no such transfer . . . made before such 3-year period shall be
treated as having been made in contemplation of death."
Two other provisions complete the picture. Section 2043 states that where uille cln-
sideration has been paid for one of the interests enumerated by prior sections, the gro,
estate may include only the excess of the fair market value at the time of decedent's death
over the consideration received. Section 2044 makes the preceding sections retroactiv,
except as otherwise specifically provided.
10. Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949), reversing 10 T.C.
961 (1948) ; Don Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 (1952), aff'd on other grounds, 219 F.2d
400 (9th Cir. 1954) ; A. Carl Borner, 25 T.C. No. 70 (Dec. 20, 1955) ; Edward Carnall, 25
T.C. No. 78 (Dec. 28, 1955).
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Such failure occurred in Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner 11 where sections
2035 and 2040 were not integrated. Sullivan and his wife held as joint tenants
securities which had been contributed solely by him.1 2 Shortly before the hus-
band's death, the couple conveyed the securities to their son. This transfer
was in contemplation of Sullivan's death, but the Ninth Circuit included only
one-half the value of the securities in the husband's gross estate.13 The court
stated that under local property law the wife owned a one-half interest in the
securities, 14 which was not includible under section 2035 because not trans-
ferred in contemplation of her death. In this way property concepts introduced
by an isolated treatment of section 2035 determined the gross estate despite
the husband's sole contribution and probable control of the joint tenancy.' 5
Recently the tax court in A. Carl Borner "I extended Sullivan to a tenancy
by the entirety. Borner and his wife transferred securities formerly held by
them as tenants by the entirety to an irrevocable trust, with income reserved
for their joint lives and the life of the survivor. Again, the husband had con-
tributed all the property to the tenancy and the transfer was in contemplation
of his death.1 7 Relying on Sullivan, the court included one-half the property
in Borner's gross estate and dismissed differences between the tenancies as
too insignificant for unlike tax results.'
Technically the Borner decision erroneously extended Sullivan because a
tenancy by the entirety does not give the wife an interest independent from
that of her spouse. In a joint tenancy each tenant owns an undivided interest
which he may individually sever.' 0 Doctrinally, the estate is held "by the whole
and by the half. ' 20 A tenancy by the entirety, in contrast, is conceptually but
11. 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949). Sullivan arose under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§
811 (c), (e), 53 STAT. 121, 122, now §§ 2035 and 2040 respectively.
12. This fact is significantly omitted by the court of appeals, though emphasized by
the tax court. Frank K. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961, 973 (1948). For the implications of con-
tribution, see notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
13. 175 F.2d at 658-59.
14. The law considered was that of California. See Stark v. Barrett, 15 Cal. 361, 368
(1860) ; People v. Marshall, 8 Cal. 51. (1857) ; Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 11 Cal. App. 2d
451, 54 P.2d 73 (1936) ; Oberwise v. Poulons, 124 Cal. App. 247, 12 P.2d 156 (1932).
15. In Sullivan control was easily inferred from such facts as 1) the tenancy property
consisted solely of proceeds from the sale of decedent's business; 2) he alone had been invest-
ing these proceeds; 3) final disposition of the property was to serve his tax needs. Frank K.
Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961, 973, 962, 969 (1948).
16. 25 T.C. No. 70 (Dec. 20, 1955).
17. Id. at2,3.
18. Id. at 4. See also Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. No. 78 (Dec. 28, 1955), decided the same
term. The relevant facts of Carnall and Borner are similar except that in the former the
transfer was from decedent and his wife as tenants by the entirety to themselves individually.
On the authority of Borner, only one-half the property was included in the husband's gross
estate.
19. BurBY, REAL PROPERTY § 189 (2d ed. 1954); 2 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 418,
425 (3d ed. 1939). Severance converts the estate of two joint tenants into a tenancy in
cummon and extinguishes the survivorship right.
20. Id. § 418, at 196 & n.3.
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one estate held by one person, "by the whole and not by the half," requiring
mutual consent for termination.2 1 Thus, Borner's conveyance of the entirety
property, though joined by his wife, in theory transferred the whole estate in
contemplation of his death.22 The full value of the property should therefore
have been included in his gross estate. True, the two tenancies are generically
similar; tenancy by the entirety is merely a form of joint tenancy modified by
the common law fiction that husband and wife are one.23 And survivorship
is a key feature of both estates.24 But the differences have been significant
elsewhere in tax and property law.25 Above all, since Sullivan turned on
technical property law distinctions, the Borner court's disregard for similar
refinements seems inconsistent,26 though it may reach a practical result.27
Of greater significance than this inconsistency, however, is the disjunctive
treatment accorded sections 2035 and 2040 in Sullivan itself. The Ninth
Circuit contended that since section 2035 does not specify the "quantum" of
taxable interest,28 Congress intended local property law to determine this
21. BvTnY, REAL PROPERTY § 190, at 328-29 (2d ed. 1954); 2 AmERIC. LAW OF
PROPERTY § 6.6(b), at 27 (Casner ed. 1952). The estate is held by husband and wife
as a unity. Id. at 23. The most important incident of tenancy by the entirety is that survivor-
ship cannot be defeated by one spouse's conveyance to a stranger. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROr-
ERTY § 430 (3d ed. 1939).
22. This proposition is nowhere more applicable than in Pennsylvania, the Borners'
domicile. There, tenancy by the entirety is "but one estate and, in contemplation of law...
held by one person." Gasner v. Pierce, 286 Pa. 529, 536, 134 Atl. 494 (1926) ; Wakefield v.
Wakefield, 149 Pa. Super. 9, 11, 25 A.2d 841 (1942). And termination may be effected only
by the joint acts of husband and wife, not by either alone. Gallagher Estate, 352 Pa. 476,
43 A.2d 132 (1945). But cf. Zipperlein Estate, 367 Pa. 622, 80 A.2d 817 (1951), declaring
that "practicalities" should govern application of the state inheritance tax. This court
regarded tenants by the entirety as each having a one-half interest where the contrary
result would cause inequitable tax consequences. Borner cites Zipperlein as furnishing
"guidance." 25 T.C. No. 70, at 5.
23. 2 Am EIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6(a), at 23 (Casner ed. 1952) ; 2 TIPFAN\Y,
REAL PROPERTY § 430, at 217 (3d ed. 1939).
24. 2id. §§ 419, 430, at 198,218-19.
25. In the gift tax field, see Commissioner v. Hart, 106 F2d 269 (3d Cir. 1939) ; cf.
United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1939) (dissenting opinion).
Creditors' rights may be significantly different as against the two estates. 2 AMIERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6, at 29 (Casner ed. 1952). Though many states have somewhat altered
these tenancies by statute, 2 id. § 6.3, at 11, 14 & n.12, they still exist in more than half the
jurisdictions, 2 id. § 6.6, at 31, 32.
26. Compare Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657, 658-59 (9th Cir. 1949)
("one joint tenant cannot dispose of anything more than his own interest in the jointly
held property .... [T]he half interest conveyed by the wife was not in contemplation of
death. She is still living."), with A. Carl Borner, 25 T.C. No. 70, at 4 (Dec. 20, 1955).
("Differences do exist between the two estates but such differences are not sufficient to
compel unlike tax results ... ").
27. See note 22 supra and text at notes 38-41 infra.
28. 175 F.2d at 658. Apparently the term "quantum" is originally Paul's: "... [L]ocal
law always defines the quantum and quality of the interest created, and the estate tax
fastens upon that interest..... (Emphasis added.) 1 PAUL § 1.10, at 72. By a curious
inversion, the Ninth Circuit reasoned front this term to a result which excludes the opera-
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factor. Local property law gives the wife a one-half interest in the joint tenancy
which is not within section 2035 because not transferred in contemplation of
her death. And section 2040 is inapplicable because the joint tenancy was
terminated prior to the husband's death.2 9 In addition, the court noted, the
wife might have proportionately reduced the husband's gross estate 30 by uni-
laterally severing her interest during his lifetime. But the concept of "owner-
ship" for estate tax purposes is based on economic contribution 31 and con-
trol 32 rather than the legal abstraction of "title." On this view, the "interest"
taxed under section 2040 is measured by the extent of the decedent's contri-
bution to the joint tenancy, 33 which in both Sullivan and Borner meant the
entire amount.3 4  And because transferred in contemplation of death, this
"interest" is regarded as if retained by the decedent at death,35 and therefore
taxable at one hundred per cent under section 2035. Furthermore, unilateral
severance by the wife less than three years before her husband's death should
not reduce the gross estate because, presumptively, for tax purposes she would
tion of tax concepts upon local law; that is, the contribution principle under § 2040 was
not employed with § 2035. See notes 32-35 infra and accompanying text. Thus, in Sullivan
local law in effect determined both the interest created and the operation of the estate
tax on that interest. The circle is completed by Borner's bland declaration that local law
"cannot control the application of the Federal tax statutes to . . . property rights," while
in the same breath expressly approving the Sullivan conclusions.
29. "[Als to the joint tenancy, the decedent had no 'interest therein . . . at the time
if his death.' " 175 F.2d at 660.
30. For any given joint estate the exact reduction effected by a severance depends on
both the size of the interest severed and the amount of the taxable estate. Such a severance
may conceivably result in complete avoidance of the estate tax by reducing the taxable
estate below the basic $60,000 exemption. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2052. This follows
because the estate tax is a progressive levy. Id., § 2001. For example, on a taxable estate
,if less than $5,000 the tax is 3%; on a taxable estate of over $250,000, but not over $500,000,
it is $65,700 plus 32% of the excess over $250,000; on a taxable estate of over $10,000,000,
the tax is $6,0'8,200, plus 77% of the excess over $10,000,000.
31. Narrowly, the "contribution" theory means that the decedent's property and no
one else's must bear the tax. 1 PAUL § 4.04, at 185. And the tax is not imposed on transfers
for a "full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth." See INT. REV. CODE,
or 1954, §§ 2035-43. Broadly speaking, however, once the objects of taxation are determined,
the amount of the tax thereon is reflected by the extent of the decedent's contribution.
Section 2040 affords a clear example: once a joint tenancy is found to exist, the tax is
nicasured according to the economic sources of that interest. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.22.
Obviously, more than half the joint estate may thus be taxed. This result was not achieved
without considerable litigation. See, e.g., Stuart v. Hassett, 41 F. Supp. 905 (D. Mass.
1941 ) and cases cited.
32. Estate tax "ownership" is based on control insofar as that policy is implemented
specifically by §§ 2036-42, but no further. See note 4 supra.
33. The operation of § 2040 according to the contribution principle has long been
recognized by the Ninth Circuit itself. See, e.g., Richards v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 904
(1953), aff'd, 221 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Steen v. United States, 195 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952).
34. See text at notes 12 and 17 supra.
35. See Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 817 (1947) ; Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704, 711 (5th Cir. 1935).
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then own nothing to transfer. The wife owns nothing because she did not con-
tribute to the tenancy and from a tax standpoint the opportunity for a valid
severence ceased when the "contemplation of death" period began.3 6 Thus,
reading sections 2035 and 2040 conjunctively gears tax consequences to the
purposes underlying these provisions 3 7
The result in Sullivan-taxation of joint tenancies according to legal title-
may be justified, however, in terms of broader tax objectives. Both the need for
section 2040 and its effectiveness in preventing tax evasion are highly doubt-
ful. As between spouses, the marital deduction now in the estate tax law
obviates the need for using joint tenancies to diminish one spouse's gross estate.
3s
In other situations, the application of section 2040 can be easily avoided by con-
verting a joint tenancy into a tenancy in common,39 in which legal title rather
than control or contribution is the measure of a decedent's gross estate.40 With-
out preventing evasion in any substantial fashion, the statute in effect strikes
at transactions in which a joint tenancy may have been created for bona fide
non-tax purposes.41 Hence this section itself might well be modified to include
36. The tax court perceived this:
"The transfer did not ... make the situation any different from what it would have
been if the decedent had died immediately before making the gift to his son....
Never having contributed any of the joint property or consideration, the surviving
tenant [wife] may not be treated under section 811(e) [§ 2040] as the owner of any
interest in the property."
Frank K. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961, 974 (1948). (Emphasis added.) No mention or refutation
of this reasoning is found in the Ninth Circuit's opinion.
37. See Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 50 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd per
curiam, 137 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1943), for a proper integration of §§ 2035 and 2040 prior
to the property law distinction raised in Sullivan.
38. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
39. See notes 19 and 20 supra. In a tenancy by the entirety, divorce accomplishes the
same result in most states. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 436, at 235-36 (3d ed. 1939) ;
BumnY, REAL PROPERTY § 194 (2d ed. 1954). But in order to evade the tax, such a con-
version to tenancy in common must occur more than three years before the death of a sole
economic contributor to the tenancy, because §§ 2040 and 2035 apply at death and three
years before death, respectively. See text of statutes, notes 7 and 9 supra. Under the 1939
Code, such reduction by inter vivos severance was harder to insure, because a transfer
any time before death could be held in contemplation of death. Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
8 811 (c), 53 STAT. 121.
It may be thought that the natural desire of the contributor to preserve control restrainb
such a severance. Moreover, survivorship is thereby forfeited. But loss of survivorship
can be offset by joint wills, though additional probate expense is incurred; besides, in many
instances when severance would occur on this plan, survivorship should be less important
than tax factors. As for control, no loss need result from a legal severance, since control
is at best only as effective as the harmony among tenants.
40. Tenancies in common are not within the scope of § 2040. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105,
8 81.22.
41. Critics regard the joint tenancy provision as the most rigorous under the estate
tax. 1 PAUL § 8.09, at 410. The most telling objection is that tax avoidance need not enter
the picture, since in many states joint tenancy is a popular and convenient form of holding
property. Of course, joint estates held for commercial uses are normally exempt from Ihe
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in the gross estate as a general rule only a joint tenant's fractional interest
irrespective of his contribution to the tenancy, except where the tenancy clearly
appears designed to avoid the estate tax.42
Nevertheless, by derogating from section 2035 the reasoning of Sullivan
threatens to undermine its other related provisions as well as section 2040.
Failure to integrate these provisions leads to improper emphasis on technical
property concepts,43 which in turn obscures the basic aim of preventing inter
vivos diminution of the gross estate without corresponding loss of control. 44
estate tax under the consideration proviso. But as to those joint estates formed for bona
fide non-tax objectives, § 2040 may be punitive. In any event this section is justified only
to the extent it actually prevents tax avoidance. Ibid.; and see note 2 stzpra.
That a tenancy in common is not reached by the estate tax except as to a decedent's
property interest therein harmonizes with the nonevasion policy of these sections, since
tenancy in common, lacking the survivorship feature, is not a "productive vehicle" of estate
tax avoidance. 1 PAUL § 8.07. Since a joint tenancy may so easily be converted to tenancy
in common, however, tax distinctions between the two are tenuous. Merely that this power
has gone unexercized at death does not make the distinction in kind any stronger, though
pragmatically some tax evasion is prevented by imposing the tax on a joint tenancy accord-
ing to the decedent's contribution. In some respects, even this is punitive, since, reasoning
from § 2035 itself, creation of a joint tenancy more than three years before death raises at
least the same presumptions of a bona fide non-tax motive as does any other transfer.
42. For optimum solution of the problem, integration of estate and gift taxes seems
necessary. See text at notes 49 and 50 infra. In the interim § 2040 should be revamped.
One way is to tax a joint tenant on his property interest only, except where the tenancy
was created within three years before the donor's death. As to these latter estates, decedent
should be taxed to the full extent of his contribution, because the transfer clearly seems to
be a tax avoidance device.
Such an approach also synchronizes with the gift tax. For those joint estates created
before the three-year period, 1) a gift tax would be paid on the donee's portion at creation
of the interest, and 2) an estate tax would be paid on the donor's share at his death.
(Of necessity, the delayed option under IT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 2515 would simultane-
ously be eliminated.) But those joint estates created within three years of the contributor's
death would continue to be taxed as at present; because the property would be regarded as
retained by decedent at death, see cases cited note 35 supra, any gift tax previously collected
would be credited against the estate tax. The changes suggested would remove the punitive
aspects of present § 2040, and at the same time maintain a policy of thwarting tax avoid-
ance. See note 41 supra.
43. To the extent that the federal tax incorporates or respects subtle distinctions in
state property law, it necessarily abandons the ideal of giving "uniform application to a
nationwide scheme of taxation." PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 5 (2d
.vr. 1938) ; ef. Fox v. Rothensies, 115 F.2d 42, 44 (3d Cir. 1940). But see note 3 supra.
44. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Sullivan was only somewhat self-conscious
about the conflict between its holding and the "nonevasion" policy of §§ 2035 and 2040.
See 175 F.2d at 659, 660. It remained for a later court to concede this result expressly,
though professing no other way out. See Don Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488, 499 (1952),
aff'd, 219 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1954). After approving Sullivan, the tax court stated:
"If this result is contrary to the basic purpose of the estate tax statute and there is a
loophole in section 811(c) [2035], the remedy lies with Congress." In view of the lower
court's careful analysis in Sullivan and the precedent set by Commonwealth Trust Co. v.
Driscoll, 50 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 137 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1943), see
note 37 supra, the expansion of this so-called "loophole" is surprising.
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To illustrate, an inter vivos gift of a remainder interest in trust, income for life
to the donor, is presently taxed by section 2036 if the income right is retained
at death. When death is imminent, the donor may release his life estate to the
remainderman. Though this release is a "transfer in contemplation of death,"
the Sullivan reasoning leads to inclusion in the donor's gross estate of merely
the property interest transferred: the worthless life estate.4 5 But this result
undercuts section 2036 which should bring into the gross estate the entire
corpus of a trust where a life estate has been reserved. 46 This reasoning similarly
applies to the relinquishment in contemplation of death of other interests specified
in sections 2036 to 2042.
47
45. Section 2036 does not govern because the life estate was not retained until death.
Therefore, § 2035 applies; but under "local law" the only property interest relinquished in
contemplation of death is the life estate, not the trust corpus. The life estate is worthless,
assuming the transferor's advanced age.
Administration of § 2036 is in accordance with U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.18. Recently,
a ruling was issued dealing with the argument proposed above. Rev. Rul. 324, 1956 INT.
REV. BuLL. No. 28, at 43. This opinion correctly holds that relinquishment of a life estate
in contemplation of death renders the entire property includible in the gross estate under
§ 2035, as if retained at death under § 2036. Nor can the tax be avoided by payment of a
consideration equal to merely the value of the interest relinquished. Two cases construing
local statutes similar to the federal estate tax are cited: In re Thurston's Estate, 36 Cal.
2d 207, 223 P.2d 12 (1950) ; Heller v. District of Columbia, 198 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
Cf. Allen v. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 630, 635 (1946). Though perhaps prompted by the
Sullivan line of cases, the ruling does not mention them. The impact on the courts of this
ruling is unpredictable. If accepted, the anomoly would exist of two distinct interpretations
of § 2035, each depending on which related provision was involved in a given case.
46. See, e.g., Myron Selznick, 15 T.C. 716 (1950), aff'd, 195 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1952);
United States v. Stark, 32 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1924) ; Carolyn Peck Boardman, 20 T.C. 871
(1953).
47. The argument is particularly applicable to §§ 2037, 2039 and 2042. Under § 2037,
for example, where decedent had retained certain powers over a trust, he was declared to
possess a taxable reversion and the corpus of the trust was included in his gross estate.
See Costin v. Cripes, 235 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1956). If similarly situated holders of such
reversionary interests now attempt to divest their interests in contemplation of death, fol-
lowing Sullivan they may plausibly assert that the only property interest relinquished under
§ 2035 is the reversion, not the trust corpus. The Sullivan rationale may similarly extend
to annuity contracts under § 2039. Ordinarily, by this section an annuity payable to a
decedent-father for life, then to a surviving son, is taxable to the father if he has paid the
purchase price. Were the father to release the income right in contemplation of death,
applying Sullivan, only the balance of the income for decedent's life would be taxed by §
2035. Finally, the argument extends to "incidents" of insurance ownership, normally taxed
according to § 2042. If, say, a power to change beneficiaries were relinquished in con-
templation of death, Sullivan would include only the value of the power in the transferor's
gross estate. This would effect significant tax savings if applied to middle age transferors.
But cf. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.25; 1 PAuL § 10.4 (1946 Supp.).
Sections 2038 and 2041 should not be susceptible to the Sullivan theory. The former
provision specifically declares that release of a power to alter or amend in contemplation
of death brings a trust corpus into the gross estate, thus avoiding any conflict with § 2035.
That this specification occurs here but not in other sections is inexplicable except by the
piecemeal fashion these sections were put together. Furthermore, no tax savings would
seem to accrue from extending Sullivan to § 2041. This follows if a general power of
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NOTES
The distortion of tax concepts by technical property law doctrines shows a
need for general reform of the gift and estate tax structure. The existing rate
differential between the gift and estate taxes invites attack from a property basis
which can yield substantial tax savings. 48 Hence, critics urge integration of the
two taxes along a single graduated rate scale. 49 Such an approach would elimi-
nate the tax advantages which now follow inter vivos diminution of the gross
estate; likewise, elaborate doctrine for preserving the gross estate intact would
become unnecessary.50 Proposals for integration, however, have long been
apathetically received by Congress, and there are no current indications of a
changed attitude.0 1 The courts are thus obliged to sustain the present tax struc-
ture. Accordingly, the Sullivan-Borner doctrine should be restricted to joint
estates in the event similar arguments are raised under related provisions.
appointment is regarded as the equivalent of total ownership; on the other hand, if the
power were to be valuated by decedent's life expectancy, the tax is practically avoided.
See note 45 supra. Of these alternatives, the former is preferable since a general power
of appointment confers the possibility of total ownership of the property until death:
thus a sale made under the power immediately before death would pass the full consideration
to heirs or legatees through the estate.
48. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 118 (1940) (dissenting opinion) ; 1 PAUL
§ 1.12, at 89; ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE TREASURY DEPARTM.[ENT, FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION: A PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION AND FOR CORRELATION WITH THE INCOME
TAX 11-12 (1947).
49. Id. at 14-17; 1 PAUL § 1.12, at 88; BITTax, FED R INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION 901-02 (1955); Warren, Correlation of Gift and Estate Taxes, 55 HARv. L.
REv. 1 (1941).
50. See especially, PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION AND FOR CORRELATION WITH THE IN-
COmrE TAX, supra note 48.
51. Thus, the 1954 Code left the gift and estate tax provisions largely unreformed, despite
a multitude of proposals. This may be the result of fundamental disagreement over the role
of the estate tax in a democratic society. See BITTER, op. cit. supra note 49, at 899-904
(1955).
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